The shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ has been debated since the early 1970s. Whilst state interventionism had been widely embraced within western societies during the post-war decades, governments gradually moved from exercising constitutional powers to acting as facilitators and cooperative partners (Rhodes, 1997). Over the course of a few decades, this resulted in governance as ‘interactive social-political forms of governing’ (Nag, 2018, p. 124).  Hira and Cohn (2003, p. 12), influenced by Keohane (2002), define governance as “the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group”. Its decentralised and flexible nature could still include public actors but would also leave space for private and third-sector parties to provide services in hybrid and temporary institutional arrangements. To formulate one single definition of ‘housing governance’ as a particular mode of governance is however difficult due to its multilevel character. Housing could relate to either a family home, a housing association, or a complete local/national housing governance framework. On a household level, Wotschack (2005, p. 2) defines governance as managing “the daily time allocation of spouses by household rules and conflict handling strategies”. The work of Wijburg (2021) indicates that local/municipal governance entails a set of public interventions, strategies, policies and provisions used to provide local needs (e.g. housing supply). On the national level, Yan et al. (2021) define public rental housing (PRH) governance as “a structure of a wide range of government and non-governmental actors that act in all its phases of PRH provision from policy design to implementation and realisation”.[1] This specific definition on PRH combines the domestic definition of governance with Wijburg’s understanding of governance on the local level. Within the Chinese context, the national government provides policies and creates nationwide operational methods, whilst local governments implement and formulate the policies locally (Yan et al., 2021). Critics point out that a more decentralised governance structure complicates the public accountability of housing provision. Peters and Pierre (2006, p. 40) distinguish problems concerning the ‘isolation’ and ‘enforcement’ of accountability. The former refers to demarcation, as it is easier to measure the performance of a government housing agency directly responsible for new build and operations, than those from the private sector in an indirect role trying to stimulate and facilitate other actors and contracting out construction and operations (Shamsul Haque, 2000). The latter relates to the accountability deficit that arises when responsibility is transferred from democratically governed municipal agencies to actors without a representative institutional arrangement, and thus without control mechanisms for tenants or the wider population (Mullins, 2006). Throughout history, understanding of governing has evolved together with the role of government. The state plays a different role in capitalism, corporatism and socialism, which has varying effects on local and/or (inter)national levels. Whilst the above paragraphs describe housing governance within a democratic governance regime, transferring the conceptual debate to autocratic or hybrid regimes would pose difficulties. Thus, finding a unique definition of housing governance applicable in all spheres remains a challenge, and the specific context must be carefully considered. Important challenges remain, and as housing provision mechanisms evolve, further exploration of housing governance, especially on a municipal level, are likely to gain importance (Hoekstra, 2020). [1] “Housing provision is a physical process of creating and transferring a dwelling to its occupiers, its subsequent use and physical reproduction and at the same time, a social process dominated by the economic interests involved” ibid.

Improving indoor thermal comfort is a widely agreed motivate for housing retrofit (Femenías et al., 2018; Outcault et al., 2022; Sojkova et al., 2019; Zahiri & Elsharkawy, 2018). Low carbon retrofit of existing social housing tends to be driven by cost, the use of eco-friendly products, and energy savings (Sojkova et al., 2019). Energy savings are particularly important in colder climates where households require larger energy loads for space heating and thermal comfort and are therefore at greater risk of fuel (energy) poverty (Sojkova et al., 2019; Zahiri & Elsharkawy, 2018). Femenías et al.’s (2018) extensive literature review on property owners’ attitudes to energy efficiency argues that renovations are typically motivated by other needs, referred to by Outcault et al (2022) as ‘non-energy impacts’ (NEIs). While lists of NEIs are inconsistent in the literature, categories related to “weatherization retrofit” (Outcault et al., 2022, p.3) refer to comfort, modernity, health, safety, education, and better indoor air quality (Amann, 2006; Bergman & Foxon, 2020; Broers et al., 2022; Outcault et al., 2022). In poorly maintained social housing, however, the desire to improve indoor air quality and thermal comfort will have an impact on energy consumption. Occupants will, for example, use extra heating to feel comfortable in a damp, mouldy, or cold home. (Zahiri & Elsharkawy, 2018).   There are three main technical improvements to low carbon retrofit: (1) enhancing the building fabrics thermal properties; (2) improving systems efficiency; and (3) renewable energy integration (Institute for Sustainability & UCL Energy Institute, 2012). In order for the Passivehaus Institut’s EnerPHit Retrofit Plan to meet Passivhaus standards for indoor air quality, homes must achieve high levels of air tightness complemented by a mechanical ventilation system including heat recovery (MVHR). Specifically, “airtightness of a building must achieve an air change per hour rate of less than 0.6 at 50 Pa of pressure (n50), and have ventilation provided by either a balanced mechanical heat recovery ventilation or demand-controlled ventilation systems” (McCarron et al., 2019, p.297). This airtightness concept is revered for saving energy, avoiding structural damage, and contributing to thermal comfort (Bastian et al., 2022) while requiring no natural ventilation such as open windows. Mechanical HVAC units alter indoor air temperature, air movement, ventilation, noise levels, and humidity (Outcault et al., 2022). But despite known benefits to physical health and clean air, this may not lead to optimum user-comfort. This is because social housing residents have unique housing needs that differ from homeowners (Sunikka-Blank et al., 2018) and cannot be predicted without resident engagement, as residents are experts in the way they live and use their homes (Boess, 2022; Gianfrate et al., 2017; Walker et al., 2014).   Post Occupancy Evaluation after retrofit has found that social housing residents are often unfamiliar with mechanical systems and their sustainable benefits, especially when retrofit occurs without resident input (Garnier et al., 2020). This can lead to misuse, overheating, the prebound effect, and the rebound effect where affordable energy bills lead to excessive heating—at times 25-26°C (Zoonnekindt, 2019)—contributing to performance gaps as high as five times the predicted energy consumption (Traynor, 2019). Other households considered mechanical systems to be bulky, ugly, and noisy, prompting removal, lack of use, and at times emotional distress (Lowe et al., 2018). DREEAM’s Berlin pilot site found one household blocking mechanical ventilation with tissue paper because they considered the air too cold and residents “haven’t been informed about the positive impact of a well working ventilation on their health and on the energy efficiency of the heating in their apartment” (Zoonnekindt, 2019). DREEAM continued the project with Green Neighbours (Zoonnekindt, 2019), an innovative engagement program co-designed with and for residents to better inform mechanical systems usage. However, literature shows (Boess, 2022; Gianfrate et al., 2017; Walker et al., 2014) that informing residents on how to use mechanical systems is unlikely to change use-habits or adequately combat performance gaps. In order to change residents’ energy behaviours, resident stakeholders should be integrated in retrofit decision-making.

Window guidance is a credit policy allowing central banks to steer bank lending toward certain economic activities. In the post-war period, it was common for both developed and emerging economies to employ various forms of credit control and allocation. However, these policies were virtually discontinued by the 1980s and the mandate of the central banks was reduced to controlling inflation through interest rates. Housing affordability and sustainability are strongly interlinked with monetary policies, particularly because housing prices and supply rely on debt for financing (Muellbauer, 2018). This link is embodied in inflation-adapted interest rates, which are used by central banks to “cool down” the economy and control prices. Currently, high inflation has pushed central banks all over the world to increase interest rates. Increases in interest rates impact the interbank lending rates such as the Euribor or the Libor and ultimately affect the price of credit in an economy. This then influences in particular capital-intensive industries such as housing development and renovation. Social housing organisations (SHOs) which provide social -thus affordable- rental housing, particularly in North-Western Europe, are dependent on credit to finance not only the provision of housing, but also the energy-efficient renovation of their stock. The rise in interest rates resulting from central banks’ monetary policy aimed at curbing inflation puts the financial viability of renovation and new construction in jeopardy. This insight is not new, as the dependence on credit for renovation and maintenance was already foreseen as an issue in the late 90s by the British housing economist Christine Whitehead (1999). Traditionally, governments support social housing providers through grants, subsidies and through the guaranteeing of their debt (Lawson, 2013). For example, publicly owned social housing providers in Germany have their debt rated equally to that of their main owners: municipalities and regions. As a result, their financing costs also benefit from a high rating implying low-interest rates for their debt. This is also the case in France and the Netherlands where ultimately it is public institutions that guarantee SHO debt. For instance, a Dutch social housing provider raises debt at a triple AAA rating, that of the Dutch state. This lowers their interest costs in comparison to that of other companies which may be rated lower, hence have a higher risk premium and pay more for their debt (Fernández et al., forthcoming). In an inflationary environment, where interest rates rise across the board, this means higher financing costs for SHOs despite their risk premium remaining constant. Window guidance is relevant in this context because it would allow central banks to set a lower interest rate for lending to certain activities, thus creating a window. During the period between 1945-1980, advanced and emerging economies alike implemented interventions on credit and capital markets. Central banks would align lending with industries, exports and manufacturing while increasing interest rates for less desirable sectors (Bezemer et al., 2023; Hodgman, 1973). According to Bezemer et al., (2023) based on Hodgman (1973) and Goodhart (1989 pp. 156–158), ‘credit guidance’, ‘credit controls’, ‘credit ceilings’, ‘directed credit’, and ‘moral suasion’ are also common names for these types of policy. More recently, organisations such as Positive Money have been advocating for a sovereign money proposal where banks would obtain funds from their national central bank with limitations on their usage (Youel, 2022). This enhanced control over bank lending opens up the possibility of earmarking private capital for investment in decarbonisation activities. For example, lending for speculative purposes or for highly polluting activities could be curtailed while the financial viability of environmentally friendly activities could be expanded. Ultimately, credit controls offer the possibility to guide credit toward the provision of affordable and sustainable housing and away from sectors such as fossil fuels or speculative bubbles.  

The in-depth study of energy poverty as a social phenomenon commenced in the late 19th century through the works of British social researchers Booth and Rowntree (O’Connor, 2016). This era was characterised by significant social and economic transformation, and these scholars were troubled by the living conditions and welfare of impoverished urban populations, who were residing in congested and unsanitary environments. Throughout the 20th century, poverty in policy contexts became quite narrowly defined as a lack of income. However, it was another social concern in the UK that led to the development of concepts like ‘fuel poverty’ or ‘energy poverty’ a century after Booth and Rowntree.[i] Following the 1973 oil crisis, the Child Poverty Action Group took the initiative to address how increasing energy costs were affecting low-income households in the UK (Johnson & Rowland, 1976). As essentials like heating, electricity, and fuels became necessary for maintaining a decent standard of living in modern British society, this advocacy group pushed for government financial support. Later, Bradshaw and Hutton (1983) introduced a narrower definition of energy poverty: “the inability to afford adequate heat in the home”. Since then, studies on energy poverty have typically excluded motor fuels, as they fall under transport poverty, a related but separate area of study (Mattioli et al., 2017). Energy poverty, as defined by Bouzarovski and Petrova (2015, p. 33), refers to "the inability to secure or afford sufficient domestic energy services that allow for participation in society." Although the precise boundaries of relevant domestic energy usage are still debated, this definition expands beyond mere heating as it encompasses energy used for cooling, which is particularly relevant in warmer climates (Thomson et al., 2019). Moreover, it enables a socially and culturally dependent understanding of what it means to participate in society (Middlemiss et al., 2019). On 13 September 2023, the European Union (2023) officially defined energy poverty as “a household’s lack of access to essential energy services, where such services provide basic levels and decent standards of living and health, including adequate heating, hot water, cooling, lighting, and energy to power appliances, in the relevant national context, existing national social policy and other relevant national policies, caused by a combination of factors, including at least non-affordability, insufficient disposable income, high energy expenditure and poor energy efficiency of homes”. The doctoral thesis and subsequent book by Brenda Boardman, Fuel Poverty: From Cold Homes to Affordable Warmth (1991), marked a significant breakthrough in energy poverty research. She emphasised the detrimental impact of energy-inefficient housing on health and quality of life. In the decades that followed, substantial literature confirmed her qualitative findings (Thomson et al., 2017). Notably, studies have demonstrated the adverse effects of living in energy poverty on physical health (Liddell & Morris, 2010), mental health (Liddell & Guiney, 2015), stress levels (Longhurst & Hargreaves, 2019), social isolation (Harrington et al., 2005), and absenteeism (Howden-Chapman et al., 2007). Boardman’s work introduced an indicator that has remained influential to this date, although it was not the first attempt to operationalise the concept of fuel poverty (Isherwood & Hancock, 1979). Her ‘2M’ indicator categorises a household as energy poor if it needs to allocate twice the median share of its budget for energy expenses to heat its home adequately. Boardman calculated this threshold to be 10% at that time. Due to its simplicity and ease of comprehension, many governments directly adopted this 10% threshold without considering specific contextual circumstances. Since the early nineties, numerous attempts have been made to develop alternative indicators. Highly influential ones include ‘Low Income High Cost’ (LIHC) by John Hills (2012), ‘Low Income Low Energy Efficiency’ (LILEE) that subsequently became the official British indicator (BEIS, 2022), and a 'hidden' energy poverty indicator by (Meyer et al., 2018). Critiques of these indicators focus, amongst other things, on their simplicity and perceived 'technocratic' approach (Croon et al., 2023; Middlemiss, 2017). This marked the beginning of significant government commitment, initially in the UK and later in other countries to address energy poverty. Although certain forms of cold weather payments had already been introduced by the UK's Conservative administrations, it was under the successive governments of Blair and Brown, following the publication of Boardman's work, that programmes such as the Winter Fuel Payment and Warm Home Discount were implemented (Koh et al., 2012). The UK examples highlight bipartisan support for addressing energy poverty, with both the Conservatives and Labour backing these efforts. This policy objective has also gained momentum in various legislative contexts, leading the EU to incorporate energy poverty alleviation as a fundamental pillar of the European Green Deal and a specific goal of its landmark Social Climate Fund (European Commission, 2021). Over the last three decades, public interest in energy poverty as a 'wicked' problem has surged, particularly during the recent energy crisis. This crisis began in 2021 when energy markets tightened due to a post-pandemic economic rebound, and it worsened dramatically after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (IEA, 2023). Extensive research on the impact of this price surge on energy poverty levels has been carried out throughout Europe and globally (Guan et al., 2023; Simshauser, 2023). Consequently, energy poverty has become a significant focal point in discussions related to the 'just transition,' especially within the realm of energy justice, as it serves as a valuable concept for targeting policies towards a specific vulnerable group in this context (Carrosio & De Vidovich, 2023).     [i] ‘Fuel poverty' and 'energy poverty' are used interchangeably, with the former being more common in the UK and the latter in mainland Europe (Bouzarovski & Petrova, 2015). Previously, scholars in the UK used 'energy poverty' to denote a lack of access to energy and 'fuel poverty' when affordability was the concern (Li et al., 2014). However, this distinction is no longer maintained.

The scholarly discourse on targeting versus universalism in social protection has significantly influenced the evolution of global welfare states over the past century and a half. Recently, surging energy prices across Europe have reignited the debate over choosing between universal household support or targeted relief, mirroring a similar discussion on the trade-offs between efficiency and equity in providing renovation subsidies. This vocabulary entry delves into the advantages and disadvantages of each approach, while exploring various attempts to find middle ground between the two (e.g., ‘targeted universalism’), particularly in the context of affordable and sustainable housing. Historic context In the 1880s, Germany established one of the earliest forms of the modern welfare state with its Bismarckian system (Manow, 2020). It introduced social insurance programmes to address workers' issues such as healthcare, insurance, and pensions for the elderly. While revolutionary for its time, the system was modest in scope and initially limited to workers and their dependents. In the decades that followed, social welfare programmes across Western Europe expanded to cover a wider range of risks, gradually incorporating non-working populations into social protection schemes. The Great Depression catalysed the recognition of the state's crucial role in social welfare, a stance prominently advocated by economists such as Keynes. Following WWII, there was a widespread consensus on the importance of improving working-class living conditions to avert future disasters. The Beveridge Report, authored by Sir William Beveridge (1942), played a crucial role in reshaping the British welfare state and influencing welfare policies worldwide. It proposed an expansive social security system with universal coverage in areas like health and unemployment insurance. Many of the Beveridge Report's recommendations were implemented in the UK and significantly shaped the post-war social landscape after WWII under the government of Clement Attlee (Reeves & McIvor, 2014). Although the Report appeared to favour universalism, it did incorporate means-tested elements for specific benefits, creating a nuanced approach that combined universalism with targeted support to address poverty and meet specific needs. In the latter half of the 20th century, the evolution of different welfare states led to varying housing outcomes. The UK's liberal regime shifted to a more targeted dualist rental system with an increasing focus on homeownership, in contrast to corporatist and particularly social democratic regimes with a unitary rental system that aligned more with universalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kemeny, 2001). Interestingly, housing presented a unique challenge in Beveridge's pursuit of universalism. He dedicated nine pages to the 'problem of rent', acknowledging significant geographical variations in rent levels while recognising that they were often not a matter of choice (Lund et al., 2021). Beveridge considered covering actual rent costs but realised this conflicted with his principle of flat-rate benefits. His solution was to recommend a national average rent allowance, differing only for working and pensioner households. Given the rent disparities, larger families' higher rent needs, and poor housing conditions, Beveridge's plan risked falling short of providing universal subsistence. To address this, he suggested post-war housing improvements in later publications (Beveridge, 1949, 1952), including increased supply and better quality of housing in order  to reduce rent disparities across the UK. He advocated for the creation of New Towns and incentivising voluntary housing associations, hoping that enhancing housing quality would lead to  improvements in relative affordability. Advantages and disadvantages of approaches Beveridge’s ‘problem of rent’ mirrors a core dilemma central to the debate on universalism and targeting. While a universal approach aims for inclusivity by covering all households, ensuring that no one is left out, the support offered in a universal system may not be as substantial as in a targeted approach. This could potentially fall short of providing adequate relief to those with the most significant needs. The universalist approach offers numerous advantages (Thompson & Hoggett, 1996). It not only promises inclusivity but also enjoys greater public acceptance. Furthermore, its simplicity in administration streamlines implementation and reduces administrative complexities. By eliminating the need for means testing or eligibility criteria, it simplifies the delivery of benefits. However, universalism also comes with its share of drawbacks. The cost implications of providing benefits universally can be substantial, potentially straining government budgets, without necessarily providing sufficient support to those in need. Additionally, responding to crises and price shocks with universal support, often referred to as ‘helicopter money,’ can cause substantial inflationary pressure. In the context of affordable and sustainable housing, there is a particular disadvantage to this approach. Universal energy subsidies may diminish the incentive for high-income homeowners, who typically spend the most on energy, to reduce consumption or invest in energy efficiency (Lausberg & Croon, 2023). Simultaneously, low-income households in energy-inefficient dwellings may hesitate to use heating due to leakages and financial concerns (Betto et al., 2020), potentially making them ineligible for support. In his influential essay on the ‘Political Economy of Targeting’, Amartya Sen (1998) describes the pros and cons of targeting. A major benefit is cost-effectiveness, directing resources efficiently to the most vulnerable and ensuring maximum impact for the targeted groups. However, the approach is impaired by potential exclusion errors, wherein genuinely disadvantaged households might be overlooked due to stringent eligibility criteria. Additionally, the stigma associated with being a beneficiary can lead to negative social consequences. Furthermore, the administrative complexity involved in identifying and reaching the right households is a significant hurdle, requiring comprehensive and accurate systems. This final complication is especially evident in the government's response to the energy crisis in Europe, as policymakers have cited a shortage of data, time constraints, and rigid social compensation mechanisms to explain why they could not effectively assist those who are most vulnerable (Natili & Visconti, 2023). Finding middle ground Universal and targeted approaches coexist in most social welfare systems (Jacques & Noël, 2021). Many European countries have implemented a universally accessible pension system, ensuring entitlement to benefits for everyone of a certain age, supplemented by targeted support for elderly individuals lacking private income. Moreover, several European countries approach housing renovation in a comparable manner, offering general subsidies to all residents while also implementing means-tested subsidies for households considered vulnerable. Another branch of public policy emphasises ‘targeted universalism,’ focusing on designing support policies and interventions that prioritise and address the specific needs of disadvantaged households while still providing benefits to everyone (Powell et al., 2019). In other words, these policies are available to all but particularly important to some. One example would be the reduction in the cost of public transport, a service that is available to everyone but predominantly used by households with lower incomes. Other examples include childcare subsidies and job training programmes, which are particularly beneficial for low-income families struggling to access quality childcare and for disadvantaged individuals looking to improve their job prospects, respectively (Coote & Percy, 2020). While the European Commission places a strong emphasis on targeting in its criteria for funding from the Social Climate Fund (SCF), Member States could consider strategies to implement policies that embody the principles of targeted universalism. For instance, in many Western European countries, a potential approach could involve prioritising the renovation of social housing. Given that energy poverty is prevalent among social tenants in these housing regimes, it would be logical to extend financial support or fiscal incentives to their landlords, such as tax deductibility of renovation costs or government guarantees for low-interest loans (Seebauer et al., 2019). On the other hand, the majority of energy poor households in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe own their homes. In this context, an effective strategy that combines targeted and universalistic elements would entail investing in ‘one-stop-shops’ that offer comprehensive renovation services (Bertoldi et al., 2021). These establishments would provide bundled services such as energy audits, renovation works, and financing. By leveraging economies of scale and specialised expertise, they can effectively reduce costs and offer affordable renovation solutions to disadvantaged groups. Although one-stop-shops are accessible to all, they can be targeted at households experiencing specific information deficits, such as those confronted with language barriers, digital illiteracy, or limited expertise within their social networks. The EU explicitly states that Member States can use the SCF for “targeted, accessible and affordable information, education, awareness and advice on cost-effective measures and investments, available support for building renovations and energy efficiency” (European Parliament, 2023, p. 16)

Defining deliberative democracy  Deliberative democracy is a form of democracy that emphasizes the role of discussion and deliberation in the decision-making process. Unlike traditional democratic models that prioritize voting and the aggregation of preferences, deliberative democracy focuses on the quality and process of debate among citizens. The core idea is that through reasoned argument, dialogue, and the exchange of ideas, participants can reach more informed, reflective, and legitimate decisions. In a deliberative democracy, participants are encouraged to engage in discussions that are open, equal, and inclusive. This means that all participants have an equal opportunity to speak, be heard, and influence the outcome. The deliberative process typically involves several key components. Key components of deliberative democracy Inclusiveness: Ensures that all those affected by a decision have the opportunity to participate in the deliberation, including marginalized and minority voices (Rasmussen, 1994). Reason-giving: Expects participants to provide reasons for their positions and engage with the reasons provided by others, fostering understanding, social learning, and respect. Respect and civility: Essential requirements for a respectful and civil exchange of ideas, listening to each other, and refraining from personal attacks. Informed and rational discourse: Encourages participants to have access to relevant information and engage in critical thinking to evaluate different arguments. Consensus-orientation: Despite possible conflicting and plurality of views and values on the issue under scrutiny it is crucial to reach decisions that reconcile and are acceptable to all participants, or at least to the majority, while respecting minority opinions. It therefore has transformative potential. Deliberative democracy aims to harness the "forceless force of the better argument" (Habermas, 1975, 108) in an environment that is tolerant of dissent. It can take various forms, including citizens' assemblies, deliberative polls, and participatory budgeting, designed to facilitate structured and meaningful dialogue among diverse groups of people. This approach helps form a “we-perspective” (Rostbøll, 2008). Positioning deliberative democracy If we were to position deliberative democracy within the spectrum of existing democratic models (see image 1), it would likely fall between direct democracy and representative democracy. Direct democracy aims to include an impractically large number of participants, while representative democracy often creates significant distances between representatives and those they represent. For Habermas, the essence of democracy lies in discourse (Habermas, 1996), rejecting the utilitarian approach. A deliberative approach does not need to ignore the practicalities of representative democracy but can address the “imbalance between the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of democracy” (Hansen et al., 2016). The guiding principles of deliberative democracy Deliberative democracy finds its guiding principles in discursive ethics as it prioritizes reasoned dialogue and inclusive discourse to achieve collective decision-making that respects the inherent worth and equality of all participants. Both Habermas and Dryzek emphasize that ethical discourse and rational deliberation are essential for achieving mutual understanding and consensus in democratic processes. Habermas is a central figure in developing the theory of discourse ethics, which forms the philosophical foundation for his concept of deliberative democracy. One key aspect is communicative rationality. Habermas’s concept of communicative rationality emphasizes the role of reasoned discourse in achieving mutual understanding and consensus. In ´The Theory of Communicative Action´(1984), Habermas argues that democratic legitimacy arises from free and open dialogue where participants justify their claims through rational arguments. This idea is essential for deliberative democracy, which relies on inclusive and reasoned discussion to make collective decisions. It was Habermas who introduced the notion of the ideal speech situation (1983), where communication is free from coercion and participants have equal opportunities to speak and be heard. This ideal situation is crucial for ethical discourse, ensuring that decisions are reached through fair and unbiased deliberation. In his work (Between Facts and Norms, 1996), Habermas connects discourse ethics directly to democratic theory by arguing that legitimate laws and policies must be justified through public deliberation. He contends that the legitimacy of democratic decisions hinges on the quality of the deliberative process, aligning with the core principles of deliberative democracy. John Dryzek extends Habermas's ideas, emphasizing practical and inclusive aspects of deliberative democracy. He argues that legitimate democratic decision-making requires incorporating diverse discourses and perspectives (1990). He builds on Habermas's idea of communicative rationality, advocating for a democracy that is open to multiple forms of communication and expression, thus ensuring a more inclusive and representative deliberative process. Dryzek (2006) argues for the empowerment of marginalized voices in deliberative processes. He stresses that genuine deliberative democracy must engage all affected individuals, reflecting Habermas’s ethical concern for inclusivity and equality in discourse. Additionally, Dryzek (2010) focuses on the practical aspects of implementing deliberative democracy. He discusses real-world applications and challenges, drawing from Habermas’s theoretical framework but adapting it to diverse political contexts. Dryzek emphasizes the importance of creating institutional arrangements that facilitate effective and fair deliberation. Both Habermas and Dryzek see discourse ethics as integral to the functioning of deliberative democracy. Habermas provides the theoretical and ethical groundwork, while Dryzek offers practical insights and adaptations for real-world democratic practices. Together, they underscore the importance of rational, inclusive, and ethical deliberation in achieving democratic legitimacy. The relevance of deliberative democracy in affordable and sustainable housing  Deliberative democracy is particularly relevant to the development of affordable and sustainable housing policies. Housing issues are complex and multifaceted, involving economic, social, environmental, and political dimensions. A deliberative approach to housing policy can address these complexities in several ways. By including a wide range of stakeholders—residents, developers, policymakers, and community organizations—deliberative processes ensure that the voices of those most affected by housing decisions are heard. This inclusivity can lead to more equitable and just outcomes. Deliberative democracy emphasizes the importance of reasoned debate and evidence-based decision-making, which is crucial in housing policy where decisions need to balance affordability with sustainability, and economic feasibility with social equity. Achieving consensus can help build broad-based support and legitimacy for the resulting policies, particularly important in contentious areas such as land use planning, zoning regulations, and the allocation of resources for housing development. The deliberative process encourages creative problem-solving by bringing together diverse perspectives, leading to innovative solutions that might not emerge from more traditional, top-down decision-making processes. Especially when it comes to issues that have a direct and significant impact on everyone's lives, such as housing policy. Decision-making should not just fall into the remit of technocrats and politicians. The housing question should be opened up to public deliberation, as has happened in other spheres of urban planning and governance with experiences like participatory budgeting in Belo Horizonte or Porto Alegre (Baiocchi, 2005; Cabannes, 2004; Melo & Baiocchi, 2006). Deliberative democracy and public reasoning can be used as a means for more representative and equitable housing-led regeneration processes to ensure that projects are in the best interests of those directly affected and maximise social value. The democratisation of housing management can also be attained by incorporating the principles of deliberative democracy. Giving tenants more control over decision-making can have a transformative impact on the long-term sustainability of housing schemes. Sustainable housing requires long-term thinking, and deliberative democracy fosters a more holistic approach to policy-making, planning and building, taking into account the long-term consequences of decisions and the need for sustainable development. Possible implementation in the housing landscape Clapham & Foye (2019) identify three levels in which deliberative democracy can be a powerful tool to facilitate housing-related decision-making processes and evaluate housing outcomes: Dwelling scale: Standards developed to set minimum qualities of the housing stock should incorporate a component informed by bottom-up consultation that incorporates residents’ views on what constitutes a decent home. In this way, publicly discussed aspirations and needs are brought together with more quantitative and technical considerations. One example of this is the Living Home Standard, developed by Shelter (2016) following a broad consultation process in which hundreds of members of the public were convened in focus groups and workshops to define what a home means and to identify its key and most valuable elements. In doing so, the process provided the elements necessary for a meaningful exchange, public discussion and debate between participants, in which diverse viewpoints were included. Neighbourhood scale: In his reflections on the ideal size of a city, Aristotle determined a roughly appropriate size based on various characteristics that would ensure its self-sufficiency. Just as important as having access to resources, in his view, was the successful administration of a city, which had to be linked to democratic processes and wellbeing considerations (Lianos, 2016). In such an arrangement, the debate is direct, open and face-to-face. In modern-day terms, at the neighbourhood level, the local context enables a type of relationship between citizens and the city in which they recognise themselves and have a tangible interest in the issues under discussion because it is at the local scale where consequences of ill-considered decisions can have a greater impact. Sennett (2018) identifies similar characteristics in Jane Jacobs’ understanding of a well-functioning neighbourhood as the generative unit of a vibrant and thriving city. In this case, direct democracy practised at the neighbourhood level would constitute, by addition of the parts, a more democratic city. At this level, the relevant stakeholders are expected to play an active role in the participation process because of their attachment to the place. Examples include neighbourhood renewal processes, urban planning and development projects, refurbishment of housing estates or the creation of a local plan. National scale: Although often seen as terrain for more vertical forms of democratic arrangements such as representative democracy, Clapham & Foye (2019) propose deliberative democratic forums held at a national level to discuss highly political issues around housing, such as property tax relief, lad value tax abatements, house price inflation, rent reform, etc. This view aligns with that of Marcuse & Madden (2016), who call for the democratisation of the housing system as a necessary step in devising transformative solutions to the housing crisis worldwide. In order to rebalance the existing power relations, decision-making control should be handed over to those who are “the true experts on their own housing” (p.212), i.e. to those who are oppressed by the current system. A process that relies on a truly democratised housing system, i.e. a system that is open and inclusive enough to allow for broader democratic scrutiny and ensure that the input of non-experts and historically disempowered communities is accounted for. In summary, deliberative democracy provides a framework for developing a housing system that is not only affordable and sustainable but also inclusive, equitable, and widely supported by the community. By fostering open, informed, and respectful dialogue, deliberative processes can lead to more effective and legitimate housing solutions that meet the diverse needs of society.  

Ecosocial policies are “public policies explicitly pursuing both environmental and social policy goals in an integrated way” (Mandelli, 2022, p. 334). These policies aim to address environmental degradation and social inequalities simultaneously, fostering a holistic approach to sustainable development (Hirvilammi, 2020). Despite numerous proposals, the ‘ecosocial project’ often lacks coherence as a broader political agenda (Fromberg & Lund, 2024). The concept of ecosocial policy has roots in the environmental justice movement and the recognition of the interconnected crises in social and natural systems from the 1960s and 1970s (Fitzpatrick, 2014; Fritz & Lee, 2023). However, the implementation of more substantial environmental policies in the past few years has only recently propelled this concept into prominence. A significant catalyst was the Yellow Vests movement in France, which highlighted the necessity for environmentally motivated policies to be perceived as fair to avoid backlash and safeguard the climate transition (Martin & Islar, 2020). Consequently, prominent governmental bodies such as Biden’s administration in the US and the European Commission are actively pursuing ecosocial agendas to address the social impacts of decarbonisation (Graziano, 2023; Jones & Reyes, 2023). On a global scale, Western governments are urging the World Bank to integrate extreme poverty alleviation with climate change mitigation (Rogoff, 2023). Different schools of ecosocial thought Mandelli (2022, pp. 337-338) identifies several schools of thought within ecosocial policy literature. The school most dominant in literature, yet lacking significant examples in practice, advocates for degrowth or post-growth principles, arguing that GDP and environmental impacts remain coupled (Keyßer & Lenzen, 2021; Parrique, 2019). These scholars highlight that while welfare states have improved well-being of disadvantaged households, they have also exacerbated ecological crises by promoting consumption (Hirvilammi et al., 2023). Therefore, they propose ‘an equitable downscaling of production and consumption that increases human well-being and enhances ecological conditions at the local and global level, in the short and long term’ (Schneider et al., 2010, p. 512). So-called ‘limitarianist’ policies, such as maximum income limits, wealth taxes, or reduced working hours, are common recommendations within the degrowth school of ecosocial policymaking (Khan et al., 2022). Contrasting this view, other ecosocial scholars argue that economic growth is compatible with ecosocial policies, with some even claiming that such policies require a growing economy (Buch-Hansen & Carstensen, 2021). Schwartzman (2012) criticises degrowth advocates for not distinguishing between qualitative and quantitative growth and for neglecting the need for a transnational political approach to global crises. He proposes an ecosocial development agenda focused on high-efficiency agriculture and a solar-powered economy. This approach is similar to 'green growth' and 'ecological modernisation,' aiming to sustain growth through innovation and technology, and to decouple economic growth from ecological impact (Dryzek, 2013; Jackson & Victor, 2019). This alternative school, dominant in multilateral organizations like the United Nations (Koehler, 2020), aligns with the concept of a 'just transition', emphasising ecosocial policies are essential in every form of economic model or welfare state (Gough, 2021; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013; Stevis, 2023). Practical implementation Ecosocial policies can be implemented in various ways. The degrowth school advocates reducing the production and consumption of environmentally harmful goods, particularly among the affluent (Hickel, 2020). In contrast, the pragmatist school focuses on making that same production and consumption more sustainable, advocates for flexible, context-sensitive strategies rather than rigid, ideologically driven policies​ (Bonetti & Villa, 2023). In the context of affordable and sustainable housing, the focus of RE-DWELL, it implies that both schools would agree on prioritising retrofits of homes for disadvantaged households to concurrently reduce social inequities and environmental harm. However, degrowth proponents might suggest incentivising downsizing for small households in large homes or capping household energy use. In contrast, pragmatist ecosocial advocates would consider tax incentives, subsidies, and grants for constructing energy-efficient, eco-friendly buildings or target the most vulnerable with energy subsidies, approaches that degrowth thinkers would reject. Public support for these policies varies based on contextual factors like a country's wealth, climate risk, and socioeconomic disparities, as well as individual factors such as self-interest and ideological beliefs (Gugushvili & Otto, 2021). Trust in public institutions, currently low across Europe, significantly influences support for these policies (Otto & Gugushvili, 2020). Futhermore, Fritz and Eversberg (2023) found that support for degrowth-related ecosocial policies differs by class, with the economic upper class and the old working class being the most opposed, and the cultural upper class being the strongest proponents. Finally, one of the most pressing research areas in ecosocial policymaking identified by Bohnenberger (2023) is developing new delivery mechanisms and possibly even institutions – e.g. a World Carbon Bank (Rogoff, 2023) – to address social inequalities during the climate transition.

Financial wellbeing is an emerging concept with valyrious definitions, many of which focus on the financial capabilities of individuals. A household's financial wellbeing encompasses its capacity to comfortably meet current and ongoing financial responsibilities, fostering a sense of security about future obligations while enjoying the ability to make life choices (Aubrey et al., 2022). Riitsalu et al. (2023) describe it as "feeling good about one's personal financial situation and being able to afford a desirable lifestyle both now and in the future" (p.2). Brüggen et al. (2017:229) frame it as "the perception of being able to sustain current and anticipated desired living standards and financial freedom." This perception highlights the robust link of financial wellbeing influencing human wellbeing, which is a combination of "feeling good and functioning well" (Ruggeri et al., 2020:1). Other terminologies are used interchangeably to describe financial wellbeing, including financial health, financial resilience, and financial freedom (Riitsalu et al., 2023).     In the UK, the public health sector cares to raise awareness of financial wellbeing due to its impact on households' health and populations' productivity. On their official website page on Financial Wellbeing, they used the definition by The Money and Pension Service (Gov.UK, 2022: online) as follows:   "Feeling secure and in control of your finances, both now and in the future. It's knowing that you can pay the bills today, can deal with the unexpected, and are on track for a healthy financial future."   These explanations and the terminology used, including "afford" and "sustain," underscore the interconnections between financial wellbeing and the vital components of household life. These components encompass mental health, productivity, and pursuing economic sustainability in the present and future. Therefore, a household's financial wellbeing is pressured by various housing-related factors, including the costs of renting or buying and non-housing costs like utility bills and repairs, all of which can affect the household's income.   The issue of rising housing costs directly undermines financial wellbeing. This trend can be attributed to several factors, including increased construction costs, labour shortages, and rising material prices (Brysch & Czischke, 2021). Furthermore, there is a notable shortage in affordable and social housing supply (Emekci, 2021; Gov.UK, 2022). This scarcity is partly due to decreased public investment in new dwellings (Housing Europe, 2021; OECD, 2020). This issue further burdens low-income households who face high private rental costs and a gradual reduction in housing benefits (Tinson & Clair, 2020).   This issue also leads many households to cut back on essential needs. For instance, interviews with social housing residents in Scotland with low to modest incomes revealed a tendency to prioritize rent payments over other necessities, such as food and heating (Garnham et al., 2022). Similarly, Adabre and Chan (2019), , citing Salvi del Pero et al. (2016), warned that:   "Households who are overburdened by housing cost may cut back on other important needs such as health care and diet. Besides, in the medium term, households may trade-off costs for lower quality housing such as smaller size of rooms and housing in poorer locations which lack better access to education and other social amenities. The latter has often been cited as the cause of residential segregation."   Another financial burden is non-housing costs involving energy costs for heating (AHC, 2019; Stone et al., 2011). According to Lee et al. (2022), this issue persists, contributing to financial strain and even excess winter deaths in the UK. Poor housing quality raises energy bills (AHC, 2019; Lameira et al., 2022). It presents the risk of considering dwellings as affordable due to local authority support focusing on housing costs alone (Granath Hansson & Lundgren, 2019), regardless of its quality impacting energy bills (OECD, 2020). Social housing residents, particularly the ageing population and those living in poverty are at increased risk of fuel poverty (Tu et al., 2022). Fuel poverty occurs when more than 10% of a household's income goes towards energy consumption for heating (Howden-Chapman et al., 2012).   Looking forward, two factors could continue burdening households’ financial wellbeing. One factor is the fluctuating energy prices that are often increasing, such as the case in the UK (Bolton, 2024). Another factor is the impact of climate change, leading to colder winters and the potential for overheating, increasing energy demand during extreme weather conditions, as warned by the Committee of Climate Change in the UK (Holmes et al., 2019).   Non-housing costs associated with extensive housing repairs can also impact household financial wellbeing, which may arise from several factors. For instance, selecting low-quality construction materials, workforce or equipment to reduce construction costs might lead to increased repair costs over time (Emekci, 2021). Hopkin et al. (2017) highlighted a related issue in England, where new housing defects were believed to be partly attributed to the building industry's prioritization of profitability over customer satisfaction. Another factor could be improper periodic maintenance, potentially accelerating the physical deterioration of the dwelling (Kwon et al., 2020). Additionally, dwellings may fall into disrepair due to unresponsive maintenance services from housing providers, and residents may lack the financial means to cover repair costs themselves (Garnham et al., 2022).     Financial wellbeing is closely tied to household income. Low-income households are particularly vulnerable to being burdened by rising housing costs (Housing Europe, 2021; OECD, 2020), leading to financial insecurity (Hick et al., 2022). In addition, they might suffer housing deprivation due to the increasing housing and non-housing expenses coupled with their declining incomes (Emekci, 2021; Wilson & Barton, 2018). The financial pressure due to low income is further exacerbated if a household member has a disability or severe illness, potentially consuming up to 35% of their income (AHC, 2019). Recently, the COVID-19 pandemic period highlighted households' financial wellbeing vulnerability to housing-related financial challenges (Brandily et al., 2020; Hick et al., 2022; National Housing Federation, 2020). During this period, job losses led to difficulties covering housing and non-housing costs, with a third of low-income social housing residents burdened by housing costs (OECD, 2020).   The issues discussed above on dwellings being of poor quality or unaffordable harm financial wellbeing, leading to residential segregation (Adabre & Chan, 2019; Salvi del Pero et al., 2016) as well as intensifying gaps of social injustice, health injustice, poverty, and fuel poverty (Barker, 2020; Garnham et al., 2022). Without addressing those housing-related issues, many households' financial wellbeing would remain vulnerable to economic insecurity even if they live in housing considered to be "affordable" in terms of rent-to-income ratio.

Throughout history, many different terms have been used to refer to people living on the streets[1], and since the 1980s “homeless” has been the most commonly used expression. The exact number of homeless people is usually difficult to determine due to different typologies and definitions applied across the countries. Homelessness is a “manifestation of extreme poverty and social exclusion, it reduces a person’s dignity as well as their productive potential and is a waste of human capital” (Baptista & Marlier, 2019). It is a symptom of globalisation and systemic changes in the world economy (Ferenčuhová & Vašát, 2022). In 1995, Brian Cooper distinguished between absolute and relative homelessness, absolute being people with no access to shelter or the roof over their heads, while relative homelessness he divided into three degrees. Primary homelessness is “people moving between various forms of temporary or medium-term shelter”, secondary are “people constrained to live permanently in single rooms in private boarding houses” and third degree are “housed but with no condition of a “home”, e.g., security, safety, or inadequate standards” (Bilinović Rajačić & Čikić, 2021; Cooper, 1995; Tipple & Speak, 2005 ). Ferenčuhova & Vašat (2022) frame homelessness as a "structurally determined phenomenon linked to the functioning of economic and political regimes and their diversity", and that one of the causes of growing homelessness is the rapid modernisation of society. The United Nations (UN) (2009) used to distinguish between two categories of homeless people, primary (living on the street) and secondary (frequent moves, long-term sheltering, people with no fixed abode), and today the UN and most EU countries adopt a definition developed by the European Federation of Organisations Working on Homelessness (FEANTSA), which recognises different forms of homelessness and living situations within the framework of the European Typology of Homelessness and Housing Market Exclusion (ETHOS) developed in 2005. According to the typology ETHOS, there are four categories of homelessness: roofless, houseless, insecure housing and inadequate living conditions. These categories are each subdivided into housing categories, which in turn are subdivided into types of living situations (FEANTSA, 2017). “ETHOS light” typology is a simplified version of ETHOS typology with fewer categories, and is mainly used for statistical purposes and comparisons across EU countries. According to the ETHOS typology, there are many forms and manifestations of homelessness, and homelessness is more than just not having a place to sleep. There are some criticisms of the ETHOS typology, for example, that there is no clear distinction between homelessness and housing exclusion (Bilinović Rajačić & Čikić, 2021). A typology based on the risk of homelessness could be acute, immediate or potential, while a typology based on frequency and duration could be temporary, episodic or chronic (Bilinović Rajačić & Čikić, 2021). Many other typologies and definitions of homelessness are found in literature, including various theoretical streams on the causes of homelessness. Some of the main causes of homelessness in the EU are the lack of affordable housing supply and changes in the labour market, i.e., short-term and precarious employment, low wages, unemployment and long-term unemployment (Baptista & Marlier, 2019). No matter what typology or definition is applied, the homeless represent the population of absolute poverty that includes the inability to meet basic human needs, including housing (Kostelić & Peruško, 2021). The Lisbon Declaration of 2021 is a document that builds on the European Pillar of Social Rights and was signed by the relevant European institutions and Member States to work together to end homelessness. It addresses many aspects to address homelessness by recognising where homelessness is most prevalent, and who is most affected by it. The Declaration also states that existing institutions in EU Member States currently lack adequate responses and capacity (Lisbon Declaration, 2021). When it comes to ending homelessness and developing homeless reintegration programmes, there are two main approaches: the “Staircase” programme (treatment-oriented) which has an established history of application, and the innovative “Housing First” programme, which is less represented in practice but increasingly represented (housing-oriented). According to Pleace et al. (2018), services for the homeless across EU countries could be divided into typologies (Figure 1). According to this figure, Croatian service providers would mostly fit into the third quadrant: non-housing focused and low intensity support, but according to Pleace et al. (2018), other Eastern (and Southern) European countries are likely to have the same type of support and this type of service is the most common in Europe, which means overnight shelters, food distribution daycentres etc. In post socialist countries, homelessness is also understood as an emerging new social risk due to increasing mortgage default rate, which was evident in the aftermath of the Global financial crisis of 2008 (Horvat & Bežovan, 2024).   [1] vagabonds, tramps, beggars, itinerant people, homeless people