Vocabulary

Ecosocial policies are “public policies explicitly pursuing both environmental and social policy goals in an integrated way” (Mandelli, 2022, p. 334). These policies aim to address environmental degradation and social inequalities simultaneously, fostering a holistic approach to sustainable development (Hirvilammi, 2020). Despite numerous proposals, the ‘ecosocial project’ often lacks coherence as a broader political agenda (Fromberg & Lund, 2024).   The concept of ecosocial policy has roots in the environmental justice movement and the recognition of the interconnected crises in social and natural systems from the 1960s and 1970s (Fitzpatrick, 2014; Fritz & Lee, 2023). However, the implementation of more substantial environmental policies in the past few years has only recently propelled this concept into prominence. A significant catalyst was the Yellow Vests movement in France, which highlighted the necessity for environmentally motivated policies to be perceived as fair to avoid backlash and safeguard the climate transition (Martin & Islar, 2020). Consequently, prominent governmental bodies such as Biden’s administration in the US and the European Commission are actively pursuing ecosocial agendas to address the social impacts of decarbonisation (Graziano, 2023; Jones & Reyes, 2023). On a global scale, Western governments are urging the World Bank to integrate extreme poverty alleviation with climate change mitigation (Rogoff, 2023).     Different schools of ecosocial thought   Mandelli (2022, pp. 337-338) identifies several schools of thought within ecosocial policy literature. The school most dominant in literature, yet lacking significant examples in practice, advocates for degrowth or post-growth principles, arguing that GDP and environmental impacts remain coupled (Keyßer & Lenzen, 2021; Parrique, 2019). These scholars highlight that while welfare states have improved well-being of disadvantaged households, they have also exacerbated ecological crises by promoting consumption (Hirvilammi et al., 2023). Therefore, they propose ‘an equitable downscaling of production and consumption that increases human well-being and enhances ecological conditions at the local and global level, in the short and long term’ (Schneider et al., 2010, p. 512). So-called ‘limitarianist’ policies, such as maximum income limits, wealth taxes, or reduced working hours, are common recommendations within the degrowth school of ecosocial policymaking (Khan et al., 2022).   Contrasting this view, other ecosocial scholars argue that economic growth is compatible with ecosocial policies, with some even claiming that such policies require a growing economy (Buch-Hansen & Carstensen, 2021). Schwartzman (2012) criticises degrowth advocates for not distinguishing between qualitative and quantitative growth and for neglecting the need for a transnational political approach to global crises. He proposes an ecosocial development agenda focused on high-efficiency agriculture and a solar-powered economy. This approach is similar to 'green growth' and 'ecological modernisation,' aiming to sustain growth through innovation and technology, and to decouple economic growth from ecological impact (Dryzek, 2013; Jackson & Victor, 2019). This alternative school, dominant in multilateral organizations like the United Nations (Koehler, 2020), aligns with the concept of a 'just transition', emphasising ecosocial policies are essential in every form of economic model or welfare state (Gough, 2021; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013; Stevis, 2023).     Practical implementation   Ecosocial policies can be implemented in various ways. The degrowth school advocates reducing the production and consumption of environmentally harmful goods, particularly among the affluent (Hickel, 2020). In contrast, the pragmatist school focuses on making that same production and consumption more sustainable, advocates for flexible, context-sensitive strategies rather than rigid, ideologically driven policies​ (Bonetti & Villa, 2023).   In the context of affordable and sustainable housing, the focus of RE-DWELL, it implies that both schools would agree on prioritising retrofits of homes for disadvantaged households to concurrently reduce social inequities and environmental harm. However, degrowth proponents might suggest incentivising downsizing for small households in large homes or capping household energy use. In contrast, pragmatist ecosocial advocates would consider tax incentives, subsidies, and grants for constructing energy-efficient, eco-friendly buildings or target the most vulnerable with energy subsidies, approaches that degrowth thinkers would reject.   Public support for these policies varies based on contextual factors like a country's wealth, climate risk, and socioeconomic disparities, as well as individual factors such as self-interest and ideological beliefs (Gugushvili & Otto, 2021). Trust in public institutions, currently low across Europe, significantly influences support for these policies (Otto & Gugushvili, 2020). Futhermore, Fritz and Eversberg (2023) found that support for degrowth-related ecosocial policies differs by class, with the economic upper class and the old working class being the most opposed, and the cultural upper class being the strongest proponents.   Finally, one of the most pressing research areas in ecosocial policymaking identified by Bohnenberger (2023) is developing new delivery mechanisms and possibly even institutions – e.g. a World Carbon Bank (Rogoff, 2023) – to address social inequalities during the climate transition.